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DEC

Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk of the Court
Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Re:

7 1993

CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

Wendell E. Brumlev v. Utah State Tax Commission, No. 91-0242

Dear Mr. Butler:
I am writing pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to advise
the Court of some recent authority that has come to the attention of counsel while awaiting
the Court's decision on the Defendants/Appellants' Petition for Rehearing.
Point IV A of the Defendant's Petition for Rehearing (p. 4) and Point I of the Brief of
Amicus Curiae argue that Utah law provides adequate pre-deprivation procedures consistent
with the requirements of federal due process. The State would like to add the following
cases recently decided by the Georgia Supreme Court in support of that argument:
Reich v. Collins. No. S92A0621, S92A0622 (Georgia, Dec. 2, 1993)
lames B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia. No. S93A1217, S93A1218 (Georgia, Dec.

2, 1993)
Neither of these cases are readily available, so I am enclosing copies of both. To put these
cases in context, I would refer the Court to the earlier Georgia Supreme Court decision in
Reich v. Collins, 422 So. E. 2d 846 (1992) (state refund statute does not apply to taxpayer
who paid income taxes under statute subsequently declared to be unconstitutional) (copy
enclosed).
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Finally, Point IV C of Defendants/Appellants original brief in this matter argued that
the Utah statute, if requiring a refund, should not be applied retroactively. This Court's
recent decisioi 1 if i Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, V>. v^:()J22 «.i iah Dec 6, 1 * * *
is relevant to this argi iment Tho Stntr will provide a cop\ 01 rips t ^ ' to Plaintiff/Crosv
Appellants.
Thank you foi your coi isideratioi i of Uub matter.

CAROL CLAWSON

cc:

Jack C. Helgesen, Richard W lories w/encl. (by fax and i nail)
Governor Michael O I ea\ itt w /ei i d
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REICH
v.
COLLINS, et al.
REICH
v.
COLLINS, et al.
Nos. S92A0621, S92A0622.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Nov. 19, 1992.
Reconsideration Denied Dec. 17, 1992.
Taxpayer who paid state income taxes
on federal military retirement benefits
sought refund. The Superior Court, Clayton County, Kenneth Kilpatrick, J., denied
refund, and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, Clarke, C J., held that taxpayer who paid state income taxes under statute subsequently declared to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid was not entitled
to refund.

3. Taxation <*=>1097
In cases in which taxing statute is
declared unconstitutional or otherwise void,
taxpayer must have made demand for refund at time tax is paid or at time his tax
return is filed, whichever occurs last; failure to do so bars any future claim.

Carlton M. Henson, McAlpin & Henson,
Atlanta, for Reich.
Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., and Warren R. Calvert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta,
for Collins.
CLARKE, Chief Justice.
We granted the appellant's application to
appeal, OCGA § 5-6-35(a), to consider the
issue of his entitlement to a refund of state
income taxes paid on his federal military
retirement benefits in view of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Davis v.
Michigan, 489 U.S. 803, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103
L.Ed.2d 891 (1989).

2. Taxation *=»1097
Taxpayer who paid state income taxes
under statute subsequently declared to be
unconstitutional or otherwise invalid was
not entitled to refund; refund statute was
applicable only where taxes were erroneously or illegally assessed under valid law.
O.C.G.A. § 48~2-35(a).

Former OCGA § 48-7-27 created an income tax exemption for retirement benefits
paid by the State of Georgia to retired
state employees. No such exemption existed for retirement benefits paid by the federal government to retired federal employees residing in Georgia. In Davis v. Michigan, supra, the United States Supreme
Court held that Michigan's taxing scheme,
which exempted from state income taxation
all state retirement benefits, but taxed all
federal retirement benefits, violated the
constitutional principles of intergovernmental tax immunity, as well as 4 U.S.C.
§ 111.1 Because the State of Michigan
conceded that a refund would be due the
taxpayer if the Court found its taxing
scheme to be unconstitutional, it was not
necessary for the Court to determine the
merits of the taxpayer's claim for a refund.
The case was remanded to the Michigan
courts to comply with the Court's ''mandate of equal treatment," Davis, 489 U.S.
at 818, 109 S.Ct at 1509, in determining

1. This Code section permits the states to tax
"pay or compensation for personal services as [a
federal] officer or employee
if the taxation

docs not discriminate against the employee because of the source of the pay or compensation."

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Sears-Collins, J., concurred in judgment only.
1. Courts ^100(1)
United States Supreme Court's Davis
decision, holding that state may not exempt
state retirement benefits from state income
taxation while taxing federal retirement
benefits, was retroactively applicable to
case of retired military officer whose federal military retirement benefits had been
taxed by state which exempted benefits
paid to retired state employees.

REICH v. COLLINS

Ga. 847

Ctte*422 &&2d M6 (Ga. 1992)

whether the taxpayer was entitled to progpective relief from discriminatory taxation.
Following the decision in Davis v. Michigan, the Georgia legislature, in special session, repealed that portion of OCGA § 487-27 which granted retired state employees
an exemption from income taxation on their
retirement benefits. Shortly thereafter,
appellant, a retired colonel in the United
States Army, filed a claim with the appellee
Department of Revenue for a refund of
income taxes he had paid to the State of
Georgia on his military retirement benefits.
The Department denied his claim, and appellant brought this action pursuant to
OCGA § 48-2-35.
The case came before the trial court on
cross-motions for summary judgment. The
trial court concluded that former OCGA
§ 48-7-27 violated the principles of Davis
v. Michigan, supra, and partially granted
the appellant's motion for summary judgment on this issue. However, after analyzing the case under Chevron Oil v. Huson,
404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296
(1971), the trial court held that Davis v.
Michigan should not be applied retrospectively. The trial court therefore concluded
that the appellant was not entitled to a
refund, and granted the appellee's motion
for summary judgment in this regard.
The appellant concedes that if this court
determines that he is entitled to a refund,
he will be eligible only for the taxable
years 1985 through 1988.
1. We agree with the trial court that
the principles of Davis v. Michigan apply
to this case.2 However, we have determined that, with regard to the issue of
retroactive application, the case must be
analyzed under James B. Beam v. Georgia,
501 U.S.
, 111 S.Ct 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d
481 (1991), rather than the test set out in
Chevron Oil, supra.
In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468
U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 LEd.2d 200
(1984), the U.S. Supreme Court held that
Hawaii's taxing scheme, which distinguished between imported and locally distilled alcohol products, violated the Com2. We note that the State did not appeal this
422S.E.20-28

merce Clause, Following this decision,
James B. Beam Distilling Company filed a
suit for refund of taxes it had paid to the
State of Georgia, claiming entitlement to
the refund under Bacchus. In James B.
Beam v. State of Georgia, 259 Ga. 363, 382
S.E.2d 95 (1989), this court recognized that
Georgia's taxing scheme, which imposed a
higher tax on alcoholic beverages imported
into the state than on alcohol produced in
this state, violated the principles of Bacchus, supra. However, analyzing the case
under Chevron Oil, supra, we held that the
trial court did not err in applying the Bacchus decision prospectively only. The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to our
decision in Beam and reversed, holding
that Bacchus should have been applied retroactively to our decision in Beam.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that where,
in a civil case such as Bacchus, it does not
reserve the question of whether the holding should be applied retroactively, the decision "is properly understood to have followed the normal rule of retroactive application in a civil case," — U.S. at
, 111
S.Ct. at 2445, 115 L.Ed.2d at 490, and thus
the decision is to be applied not only to the
parties before it, but "to all others by and
against whom claims may be pressed, consistent with res judicata and procedural
barriers such as statutes of limitation."
Id — U.S. at
, 111 S.Ct at 2443, 115
L.Ed.2d at 488. The Court held that it is
error for a lower court to refuse to apply a
rule of federal law retroactively after the
case announcing it has already done so.
Id — U.S. at
, 111 S.Ct. at 2446, 115
L.Ed.2d at 491. The Court went on to
distinguish between the issue of retroactivity where a federal law or constitutional
question is raised, and the issue of remedies, "i.e., whether the party prevailing under a new rule should obtain the same
relief that would have been awarded if the
rule had been an old one." Id — U.S. at
, 111 S.Ct at 2443, 115 L.Ed.2d at 487.
In the normal circumstance, the issue of
retrospectivity, or choice of law, is a federal question, while the remedial inquiry is
left to the states. Id — U.S. at
, 111
ruling by the trial court.

848 Ga.
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prospective only,4 and thus not applicable
to the litigants before it, that the State of
Michigan would have conceded the taxpayer was due a refund.
Further, the issue of whether Davis v.
Michigan is to be applied retroactively is
foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision
in Barker v. Kansas, — U.S.
, 112
S.Ct 1619, 118 L.Ed.2d 243 (1992). In that
case military retirees challenged the Kansas income taxation scheme which permitted taxation of federal retirement benefits
while exempting from taxation state retirement benefits. The U.S. Supreme Court
held that this case was controlled by Davis
v. Michigan. The Court reversed and remanded to the lower court for a determination of the remaining issues, including the
taxpayers' entitlement to refunds of taxes
previously paid. As such, it is clear that
the Court applied the decision of Davis v.
Michigan retroactively to the litigants in
[1] As we read Davis v. Michigan, the Barker, just as the Court applied the BacCourt applied its decision to the taxpayer chus decision retroactively to the litigants
before it. The State of Michigan conceded in James Beam}
that if the Court found its taxing scheme to
We thus conclude that the trial court
be unconstitutional, then, under state law,
the taxpayer would be entitled to a refund. correctly held that OCGA § 48-7-27 violatOnce the Supreme Court determined that ed the principles of Davis v. Michigan, but
Michigan's taxing scheme was unconstitu- erred in holding that this case does not
tional and applied that principle to the tax- apply retroactively.
payer, Michigan conceded that the taxpayer
2. The issue of what remedy is to be
was entitled to a refund. It does not fol- afforded the appellant remains. This is a
low that if the Supreme Court had deter- question of state law. Beam, supra, —
mined that its decision in Davis was to be U.S. at
, 111 S.Ct at 2443, 115 L.Ed.2d

S.Ct at 2443, 115 L.Ed.2d at 488. The
Court stated, as a general guideline, that
when it remands a case to a lower court for
consideration of any remedial issues, this
"necessarily implies" that the choice of
law, or retroactivity, question has been decided, and that the Court will apply its
decision not only to the parties before it,
but retrospectively to all others not procedurally barred. Id. — U.S. at
, 111
S.Ct at 2445-46, 115 L.Ed.2d at 490-491.3
The State's argument in the case before
us is that because it cannot be determined
from the Court's opinion in Davis v. Michigan that the case was remanded for consideration of remedial issues since Michigan
had conceded that a refund was due the
taxpayer, it cannot be concluded that the
Supreme Court intended retroactive application of the Davis decision. We do not
agree.

3. The Court held in Beam that principles of
the civil context." Beam, — VS. at
, 111
"equality and stare decisis" prevail over the
S.Ct. at
, 115 L.Ed.2d at 490.
Chevron Oil analysis, Beam, — VS. at
, 111
S.Ct. at 2446, 115 L.Ed.2d at 491, and that the 5. We further note that the Virginia Supreme
need to ensure that the substantive law "will not
Court analyzed an identical tax issue under the
shift and spring/* la\ — VS. at
, 111 S.Ct.
principles of Chevron Oil, and determined that
at 2447, 115 L.Ed.2d at 493, limits the "possible
Davis v. Michigan is not to be applied retroacapplications of Chevron OiL" Id
tively. Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 241
Va. 232, 401 S.E.2d 868 (1991). The US. Su4. See Beam, — VS. at
, 111 S.Ct at 2443,
preme Court granted certiorari as to this deci115 L.Ed.2d at 488 for a discussion of prospecsion, vacated the judgment of the Virginia Sutive application of court decisions. Under the
preme Court, and remanded for consideration
Court's analysis, the prospective method of overin light of its decision in James Beam. — VS.
ruling cases does not apply the new rule to the
, 111 S.Ct. 2883, 115 LEd.2d 1049 (1991).
parties in the case, but only uses the case as a
On remand the Virginia Supreme Court convehicle for announcing a new rule of law. The
cluded that James Beam does not require retroprinciple of selective prospectivity, in which the
active application of Davis v. Michigan, 242 Va.
new rule is applied to the litigants before the
court, has been abandoned in the criminal con322, 410 S.E.2d 629 (1991). On May 18, 1992,
text, see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107
the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to
S.Ct 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), and "appears
that decision. — VS.
, 112 S.Ct 1934,118
never to have been endorsed [by the Court] in
L.Ed.2d 541.

CRUZ-PADILLO v. STATE
CHCM422 8 £ J d M9

(Gft.

Ga. 849

1992)

at 488. As the Supreme Court stated in
Judgment affirmed in part and reBeam, nothing deprives the State of its versed in part
"opportunity to raise procedural bars to
recovery under state law or demonstrate
HUNT, BENHAM and FLETCHER, JJ.,
reliance interests entitled to consideration concur.
in determining the nature of the remedy
SEARS-COLLINS, J., concurs in the
that must be provided
" Beam, —
judgment
only.
VS. at
, 111 S.Ct at 2448,115 L.Ed.2d
at 494.
BELL, PJ., disqualified.
[2] OCGA § 48-2-35(a) provides, in
part, that "[a] taxpayer shall be refunded
KY MMKft SYSTW
any and all taxes or fees which are deter*V***^V 2>
mined to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed and collected from him under the
laws of this state, whether paid voluntarily
or involuntarily ..." (Emphasis supplied.)
262 Ga. 629
We hold that this statute contemplates the
CRUZ-PADILLO
situation where a taxing authority erroneously or illegally assesses and collects a
v.
tax under a valid law. It does not address
The
STATE.
the situation where the law under which
No. S92A0629.
the taxes are assessed and collected is itself subsequently declared to be unconstiSupreme Court of Georgia.
tutional or otherwise invalid. This di&tinction is significant in that the State must be
Nov. 19, 1992.
\ able to rely on the laws under which it
Reconsideration Denied Dec. 17, 1992.
assesses taxes in order to promote stable
and efficient government. Furthermore,
this protects the State against those inDefendant was convicted in the Superistances in which a vendor/taxpayer has or Court, Clayton County, William H. Ison,
recouped its tax expense by passing it on to J., of felony-murder, voluntary manslaughthe consumer. See, e.g., Atlanta Ameri- ter, aggravated assault, and possession of
cana Motor Hotel Corp. v. Vndercofler, a firearm during commission of a felony.
222 Ga. 295(1), 149 S.E.2d 691 (1966); Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court,
Blackmon v. Premium Oil Stations, Inc., Bell, P J., held that (1) evidence sustained
129 Ga-App. 169, 198 S.E.2d 900 (1973); conviction for felony-murder; (2) defendant
Blackmon v. Ga Independent Oilmen's was barred from asserting that court
Ass'n, 129 Ga.App. 171, 198 S.E.2d 896 should have sentenced him for felony man(1973). Were we to interpret the statute slaughter instead of felony-murder because
differently, the vendor/taxpayer would reof his failure to object; (3) trial court's
alize a windfall or double recovery not inviolation of defendant's rights to remain
tended by the legislature.
silent and to due process was harmless
Thus we conclude that the taxpayer is error; and (4) any error in trial court's
not entitled to a refund under the provi- ruling that defendant could not introduce
evidence of victim's reputation for violence
sions of OCGA § 48-2-35(a).
[3] We take this opportunity to hold was not subject to reversal because defenthat in cases in which a taxing statute is dant made no offer of proof.
declared unconstitutional or otherwise void,
Affirmed.
riT taxpayer must have made a demand for
' refund at the time the tax is paid or at the
time his tax return is filed, whichever oc- 1. Homicide *»235
curs last Failure to do so bars any future
Evidence sustained conviction for
claim.
felony-murder; defendant motioned for vie-
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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: DEC 2 1993
S92A0621.
SS2A0622.

REICH v, COLLINS, et al.
REICH v. COLLINS, et al.

CLARKE, Chief Justice.
In Reich v. Collins, 2S2 Ga. 625 (422 SE2d 846) (1992) (Reich
v. Collins I), we were faced with the issue of whether appellant
Reich was entitled to a refund of state income taxes paid on his
federal military retirement benefits in view of the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (103
SC 1500, 103 LE2d 891) (1989).

The latter case held that a state

taxing scheme which exempts state retirement benefits from state
income taxation but does not, so exempt federal retirement benefits
violates the United States Constitution.1 The initial issue to be
determined in Reich v. Collins I was whether Davis v. Michigan
should be applied retrospectively to Reich's claim. We held that,
under

recent

decisions of

the United

States

Supreme Court,

retrospective application was required, but ultimately concluded
that state law barred Reich's claim to a refund under OCGA 48-2-35
(a).
1

Former OCGA 48-7-27 created a state income taxing scheme,
a portion of which was unconstitutional under the" authority of
Davis v. Michigan. After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Davis, the
Georgia legislature repealed the unconstitutional provisions of the
code section.
1

The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted Reich's petition
for certiorari.

That Court vacated the judgment

Collins I, and remanded the case to us

in Reich v.

f,

for further consideration

in light of Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation,"
(113 SC 2510, 509 LE2d _ _ )

509 U.S.

(1993).

In Harper, the United States Supreme Court reversed a decision
of the Virginia Supreme Court which held that the appellants in
that case were not entitled to refunds of state income taxes
because Davis v. Michigan should be applied prospectively only.
The U.S. Supreme Court initially determined that Davis v. Michigan
applies retrospectively.

It then remanded Harper to the Virginia

Supreme Court to follow the Constitutional mandate of providing
relief "consistent with federal due process principles . ,T

Harper,

113 SC at 2519.
Due

process

requires

that

a

state

provide

procedural

safeguards against the unlawful exactions of taxes, McKesson Core.
v. Division of Alcoholic Veberages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (110 SC
2238,

2250, 100 LE2d 148}

(1990), but the state retains some

flexibility in the type safeguards it must provide. Harper, supra,
113 SC at 2519; James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. The State of
Georgia, S93A1217,

(Decided December

r

1993).

In remanding

Harper, the United States Supreme Court held that
If Virginia 'offers a meaningful opportunity for
taxpayers to withold contested tax assessments and to
challenge their validity in a predeprivation hearing,'
the 'availability of a predeprivation hearing constitutes
a procedural safeguard...sufficient by itself to satisfy
the Due Process Clause.' [citing McKesson Corp v.
Division of Alcoholic Beverages L Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18;
38, n. 21]•,.. On the other hand, if no such
2

predeprivation remedy exists, 'the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide
meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify
any
unconstitutional deprivation.' 113 SC at 2519.2
In the first division of Reich v. Collins I, we held,
consistent with Harper v. Virginia, that Davis v. Michigan must be
applied retrospectively.
vacated

our judgment

Because the U.S. Supreme Court has

in that case, we expressly

incorporate

Division One of Reich v. Collins I into this opinion. We therefore
conclude that our duty on remand is to determine whether Georgia
law provided a predeprivation remedy to Reich sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of federal due process as set out in Harper and
McKesson, supra. While the selection of a remedy to be afforded is
an issue of state law, James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501
U.S.

(111 SC 2439, 115 LE2d 481, 488] (1991), this remedy must

satisfy "minimum federal requirements." Harper, supra, 113 SC at
2520.
We have recently held in James 5, Beam Distilling Co. v. The
State of Georcria, 393A1217, supra, that the declaratory judgment
remedies under OCGA 9-4-1 et seq., as well as statutory injunctive
relief remedies available provide meaningful opportunities to
taxpayers to litigate the validity of taxes alleged owing prior to
the time when the taxes fall due-3 As such, these remedies are of
2

In McKesson
the Court suggested that "meaningful,
backward-looking relief" could include a refund, Id. at 2251, or
the assessment and collection, of back taxes from those who received
favored treatment in violation of the Constitution, ££. at 2252,
3

In McKessson, supra, 110 SC at 2250, the Court held that
"[t]he State may choose to provide a form of 'predeprivation
process,' for example by authorizing taxpayers to bring suit to
3

themselves sufficient to satisfy federal due process requirements.4
Additionally, there are predeprivation remedies under the
Georgia Administrative Procedure Act of which a taxpayer may avail
himself when making a constitutional challenge to a state tax.
Under OCGA 50-13-12, a taxpayer who is aggrieved by "any act,r of
the Department of Revenue "in a matter involving..•.liability for
taxes," is entitled to a hearing before the Department, OCGA 5013-19 and OCGA 5-13-20 provide for judicial review to a taxpayer
dissatisfied with a decision by the Department of Revenue in a case
brought under OCGA 50-13-12.
Further, pursuant to OCGA 48-2-59, a taxpayer may appeal an
assessment by the Department of Revenue directly to the superior
court, without the necessity of an administrative hearingWe conclude that there are ample predeprivation remedies under
Georgia law available to a taxpayer who seeks to challenge an
allegedly

unconstitutional

tax.

These remedies

satisfy the

requirements of federal due process as set forth in McKesson and
Harper, supra.

Consequently, Reich's due process rights have not

been violated by the Department's failure to refund to him that
portion of income taxes paid in violation of Davis v. Michigan.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

All the

Justices concur except Sears-Collins and Carlev, JJ., who dissent.

enjoin imposition of a tax prior to its payment... "
4

Reach maintains that these are not viable remedies because
his lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the tax at issue in
this case was unconstitutional was dismissed by the superior courtHowever, Reich did not appeal that decision.
4

S93A0621# S93A0622. REICH v* COLLINS et al.
CARLEYf Justice, dissenting*
Former OCGA § 48-7-27 provided that state retirement benefits
were exempt from income taxation by the State, but that federal
retirement benefits were not. However# the unconstitutionality of
this former provision was established by the holding in Davis v.
Michigan. 489 U.S.

803 (109 SC 1500, 103 LE2d 891) (1989).

The

mandate of Davis is to be applied retroactively, rather than
prospectively.

Harper v. Va. Deot. of Taxation. 509 U.S* __ (113

SC 2510, 125 LE2d 74) (1993). Appellant is a Georgia taxpayer who
seeks a refund of income taxes that he previously paid to the State
pursuant to the unconstitutional provisions of former OCGA § 48-727.

There is no question of appellant's standing to seek such a

refund.
Ga.

Compare James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. State of Ga-,

(Case Number S93A1217, decided December

, 1993). However,

the majority nevertheless holds that appellant is not entitled to
seek a refund because federal due process has otherwise been
satisfied. In my opinion, appellant is entitled to the refund that
he seeks and I must, therefore, dissent.
Where, as here, a taxpayer seeks a refund of state taxes that
he has paid pursuant to a statute which is in contravention of the
federal constitution, M[s]tate lav may provide relief beyond the

demands of federal due process, [cit.], but under no circumstances
may it confine [the taxpayer] to a lesser remedy, [cit.]," Harper
v, Va«

Deot-

of Taxation, supra at

(III) •

parameters of federal due process are clear.
w%

offered

a

The minimum

If a state has

meaningful opportunity for taxpayers to withhold

contested tax assessments and to challenge their validity in a
predeprivation hearing,* the *availability of a predeprivation
hearing constitutes a procedural safeguard •. • sufficient by itself
to satisfy the Due Process Clause-'

[Cit.] On the other hand, if

no such predeprivation remedy exists, %the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the state to provide meaningful
backward-looking

relief

to

rectify

any

unconstitutional

deprivation.' [Cit.] In providing such relief, a State may either
award full refunds to those burdened by the unlawful tax or issue
some other order that %create(s) in hindsight a nondiscriminatory
scheme.'
(III)-

[Cit.]"

Harper v. Va- Dent- of Taxation, supra at

in responding to the unconstitutionality of former OCGA §

48-7-27, Georgia did not create "in hindsight a nondiscriminatory
scheme* by assessing and collecting back income taxes from those
taxpayers whose state retirement benefits had previously been
exempted

from taxation*

See McKesson v. Div. of Alcoholic

Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 40 (III) (B) (110 SC 2238, 100
LE2d 148) (1990)•

Georgia merely repealed the unconstitutional

provisions of that former statute.

Accordingly, appellant is

constitutionally entitled to a refund unless he had available to
him at the time that he paid the taxes a meaningful opportunity to
2

withhold their payment and to challenge their validity
predeprivation hearing.

in a

H

[I]f a State chooses not to secure

payments under duress and instead offers a meaningful opportunity
for

taxpayers to withhold

contested

tax

assessments

and to

challenge their validity in a predeprivation hearing, payments
tendered may be deemed %voluntary.' . •. * (W)here voluntary payment
(of a tax) is Knowingly made pursuant to an illegal demand,
recovery of that payment may be denied.'"

McKesson v. Div. of

Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, supra at 38 (III) (B), fn. 21.
The issue for resolution isr therefore, whether appellant paid the
unconstitutional taxes "voluntarily" or under "duress."
In my opinion, nothing under the specific provisions of the
state tax code can be said to have provided appellant with the
opportunity

for

a

constitutionally

meaningful

predeprivation

challenge to his payment of taxes pursuant to the unconstitutional
provisions of former OCGA § 46-7-27, The majority cites OCGA § 482-59 as affording appellant such an opportunity. Subsection (a) of
that statute does provide generally for an "appeal from any order,
ruling, or finding of the commissioner to the superior court.,.."
However, subsection (c) further provides that, in order to secure
review by the superior court, the taxpayer must file a surety bond
or other security "conditioned to pay any tax over and above that
for which the taxpayer has admitted liability and which is found to
be due by a final judgment of the court, together with interest and
costs."

By conditioning the taxpayer's right to appeal upon the

posting of "a surety bond or other security,"

3

OCGA § 48-2-59 does

not, in my opinion, satisfy '""the root requirement" of the Due
Process Clause . . • ,fthat an individual be given an opportunity for
a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property
interest,"' [cit.].*.."

(Emphasis in original-) McKesson v. Div*

of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, supra at 37 (III) (B) . To the
contrary, that statute is merely one of the "various sanctions and
summary remedies [contained in the tax code which are] designed so
that [taxpayers] tender tax payments before their obligations are
entertained and resolved."

(Emphasis in original.)

McKesson v.

Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, supra at 38 (III) (B).
Thus, I cannot agree with the majority that OCGA § 48-2-59
satisfies minimum

federal due process requirements such that

appellant's failure to have resorted thereto renders his payment of
the unconstitutional
refundable.

state income taxes "voluntary" and non-

W

A state that %establish(es) various sanctions and

summary remedies designed' to prompt taxpayers to

1

tender . •.

payments before their objections are entertained or resolved' does
not provide taxpayers xa meaningful opportunity to withhold payment
and

to

obtain

assessment's

a

predeprivation

validity.'

constitutionally significant

determination

[Cit*]

such

of

limitations

the

tax

impose

*"duress*" because a tax payment

rendered under these circumstances must be treated as an effort *to
avoid

financial

property*'

sanctions or a seizure of real or personal

[Cit.]

The State accordingly may not confine a

taxpayer under duress to prospective

4

relief."

(Emphasis in

original.) Harper v. Va. Deot« of Taxation, supra at

(III), fn.

10.
The majority also finds that the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)

afforded

predeprivation

appellant
remedy

unconstitutional taxes.

for

a

constitutionally

contesting

his

meaningful

payment

of

the

Subsection (a) of OCGA § 50-13-12 does

provide that the ••Department of Revenue shall hold a hearing upon
written demand therefor by any taxpayer aggrieved by any act of the
department in a matter involving his liability for taxes....*
However,

appellant

was

not

"aggrieved

by

any

act

of

the

department,w

but by an allegedly unconstitutional act of the

legislature*

Even assuming that the department would have had

initial jurisdiction under the APA to entertain a challenge to the
constitutionality of former OCGA § 48-7-27, such a challenge would
be "futile at the time of its making.11 Flint River Mills v. Henry,
234 Ga« 385, 386 (216 SE2d 895) (1975).

Thus, to secure a ruling

on the constitutionality of former OCGA § 48-7-27 pursuant to the
APA, appellant would presumably have been required to undergo an
entirely "futile" hearing before the department and then incur the
additional expenditure of time and money pursuing an appeal to the
superior court.

The availability of such an attenuated process

cannot, in my opinion, be deemed to have provided appellant "with
all of the [predeprivation] process [he] is due: an opportunity to
contest the validity of the tax and a %clear and certain remedy'
designed to render the opportunity meaningful by preventing any *. -

5

[pre]deprivation of property.M

McKesson v. Div. of Alcoholic

Beverages and Tobacco, supra at 40 (III) (B)„
Moreover, nothing in OCGA § 50-13-12 authorizes the taxpayer
to

withhold

his

taxes

pending

resolution

of

his

purported

administrative remedy and compels the department to forego the
various sanctions and summary

remedies that it is otherwise

authorized to employ against the taxpayer under the tax code.
Subsection (c) of that statute merely provides that, pending the
hearing and decision, the department "pay suspend or postpone the
effective date of its previous action."

(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, "[a] taxpayer who chooses [the administrative] remedy • *. is
subject to the discretion of the commissioner and/or reviewing
court as to whether collection procedures will be stayed ([cit.]) ."
Gainsville-Hall county Economic Opportunity Org. f Inc. v. Blackmon.
233

Ga.

507,

508

(I)

(212

SE2d

341)

(1975).

Since

the

administrative remedy relied upon by the majority does not clearly
protect the taxpayer against the department's employment of its
various sanctions and summary remedies designed to encourage timely
payment prior to resolution of the dispute, I cannot agree with the
majority's conclusion that that remedy satisfies the minimum
requirements of federal due process. "We have long held that, when
a tax is paid in order to avoid financial sanctions or a seizure of
real or personal property, the tax is paid under *duress' in the
sense that the state has not provided a fair and meaningful
predeprivation procedure.

[Cits•]" McKesson v. Div. of Alcoholic

Beverages and Tobacco, supra at 38 (III) (B) , fn. 21.

6

The majority also relies upon the Declaratory Judgment Act as
affording appellant a constitutionally meaningful predeprivation
remedy.

However, there is considerable doubt whether any general

remedial statute, such as a declaratory judgment actf can ever be
considered to be an available "clear and certain remedy11 such that
a taxpayer's failure to have invoked those provisions can be deemed
to evidence his "voluntary0 payment of unconstitutional taxes. As
I understand the mandate of the controlling decisions of the
Supreme court of the United States, the determination of the
availability of a taxpayer's "clear and certain'1 predeprivation
remedy should be confined to a consideration of the specific tax
structure enacted by the state, and not be based upon the existence
of general remedies which, with the benefit of hindsight, can be
urged to have otherwise been available to the taxpayer* See Harper
v. Va» Dept, of Taxation, supra, and McKesson v. Div. of Alcoholic
Beverages

and Tobacco, supra, neither of which

discuss the

availability of general, rather than specific, taxpayer relief.
Confining our inquiry to the specific statutes, such as 0CGA § §
48-2-59 and 50-13-12, which do relate to the resolution of tax
disputes, it is clear to me that Georgia has established "various
sanctions and summary remedies designed so that [taxpayers] tender
tax payments before their objections are entertained and resolved.
As a result, [Georgia] does not purport to provide taxpayers like
[appellant] with a meaningful opportunity to withhold payment and
to obtain a predeprivation determination of the tax assessment's

7

validity*.. •'*

(Emphasis in original.)

McKesson v. Div» of

Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, supra at 38 (III) (B).
In any event, I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion
that the Georgia Declaratory Judgment Act can be considered to be
such a "clear and certain remedy11 that appellant's failure to have
invoiced its provisions evidences his * voluntary11 payment of the
unconstitutional

taxes.

As

is

true

in

the

case

of

the

administrative remedy, there is nothing in our Declaratory Judgment
Act which authorizes the taxpayer to withhold his taxes pending
resolution of his claim or which compels the department to forego
employment of the various sanctions and summary remedies that it is
otherwise authorized to pursue under the tax code. The trial court
is authorized to grant the taxpayer injunctive relief, but the
exercise of that authority is discretionary and a taxpayer cannot,
thereforef be assured that the department's collection procedures
will be stayed.

Since the declaratory judgment remedy advanced by

the majority does not clearly protect the taxpayer against the
department's

employment

of its various sanctions and

summary

remedies which are otherwise designed to encourage timely payment
of taxes prior to resolution of the disputef I cannot agree with
the majority's conclusion that that remedy satisfies the minimum
requirements of federal due process.
For all the reasons stated, I believe that appellant's payment
of the unconstitutional taxes was not made "voluntarily,w but was
made under "duress.11
opinion erroneously

I believe, therefore, that the majority

,f

confine[s] [appellant] to a lesser remedy"

8

than that which federal due process demands. Harper v. Va. Depfc.
of Taxation, supra at
dissent

to

the

CHI)- Accordingly, I must respectfully

majority's

failure

to

afford

appellant

the

"meaningful backward-looking relief11 of the refund to which he is
constitutionally entitled. Harper v> va. Dept, of Taxation, supra
at

(III).
I am authorized to state that Justice Sears-Collins joins in

this dissent.
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JAMES B. BEAM DISTILLING CO, V. STATE OF
GEORGIA et al. (two cases)

BENHAM, Justice4
Appellant James B* Beam Distilling company (Beam) brought this
action seeking a refund for taxes paid pursuant to OCGA § 3-4-601
in 1982-1984. See OCGA § 48-2-35*

The trial court's decision that

OCGA § 3-4-60 violated the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution was affirmed by this court, as was the trial court's
determination that the ruling was to be applied prospectively only*
James B. Beam &c, v. State of Georgia. 259 Ga. 363 (382 SE2d 95)
(1989)

{"Beam

I").

After

granting

Beam's

application

for

certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that its

*The statute was amended in 1985 after the United States
Supreme Court found a similar statute from Hawaii to be an
unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause (Bacchus imports
V- Dias, 468 U.S* 263 (104 SC 3049, 82 LE2d 200) (1984)), and the
amended statute has withstood constitutional challenge.
See
Heublein, Inc. v. State of Georgia, 256 Ga, 578 (351 SE2d 190)
(1987)•

decision in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (104 SC
3049, 82 LE2d 200) (1984), was applicable retroactively to Beam's
claims that arose on facts antedating the Bacchus decision, and
remanded the case for determination of remedial issues. James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S*
481) (1991).

(111 SC 2439, 115 LE2d

We, in turn, remanded the case to the trial court

which granted summary judgment to appellee after concluding, based
on three independent grounds, that appellant was not entitled to a
refund of the 1982-84 taxes.

The appeal in S93A1217 is from the

trial court's denial of summary judgment TO Beam and the grant of
summary judgment to the state on Beam's original complaint.

The

appeal in S93A1218 is from the trial court's denial of summary
judgment to Beam on the allegations raised in the first and second
amendments to its complaint, and the grant of summary judgment to
the State on the amendments*
1. After our remand to the trial courtf appellant amended its
complaint to seek a judicial determination that OCGA § 48-2-3 5 (the
refund statute) was applicable to appellant and that the 1992
amendment to OCGA § 3-2-14 (a) was unconstitutional as applied to
Beam; and to assert a claim under 42 USC § 1983 and a concommitant
claim for attorney fees under 42 use § 1988. The State amended its
answer to

assert

several additional defenses,

including the

assertion that appellant did not have standing to seek a refund
under OCGA § 48-2-35.* We entertain the State's standing argument
*The U.S. Supreme Court invited the State to invoke, on
remand, independent procedural bases for its refusal to provide a
refund. See Beam Distilling Co, v. Georgia.supra, ill SC 2439,
2

because the consideration of a remedy "may well be .. , obviated by
issues of state lav." Bacchus Imports. Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263,
277 (104 SC 3049f 82 LE2d 200} (1984) .3
2.

"A particular remedy is not available to a party who has

no entitlement to the right sought to be secured*" Raqsdale v. New
England Land &c. Corp,, 250 Ga- 233 (1) (297 SE2d 31) (1982). In
cases involving the Georgia sales and use tax (OCGA § 48-8-30 et
seq,)# the appellate courts of this State have repeatedly held that
the payer of taxes to the state, while technically a "taxpayer"
under § 48-2-35r does not have standing to file a claim for refund
of taxes illegally collected or erroneously paid if the party
remitting the taxes passed the tax on to its customers„

Eimco BSP

Services Co. v. Chilivis. 241 Ga* 263 (244 SE2d 829) (1978);
Atlanta Americana Motor Hotel Corp, v, TJndercofler. 222 Ga. 295 (1)
(149 SE2d 691) (1966); Blackmon v. Ga, Ind, Oilmen's Assn., 129 Ga,
App. 171

(3) (198 SE2d 896) (1973); Blackmon v. Premium Oil

Stations, Inc, . 129 Ga- App, 169 (2) (198 SE2d 900) (1973). If the
remitting party did not bear the burden of the tax, it is not
entitled to bring a suit to recover a refund of any overpayment.
In the case at bar, the applicable version of OCGA § 3*4-60
(1) levied and imposed an excise tax on alcohol and distilled

2448.
3

For purposes of this appeal, we assume that OCGA § 48-2-35
may be an appropriate means by which one may seek a refund of taxes
paid pursuant to a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional.
See State of Georgia v. Private Truck Council &c» . 258 Ga, 531 (371
SE2d 378) (1988), But see Reich v. Collins, 262 Ga. 625 (422 SE2d
826) (1992)3

spirits imported into Georgia*

By requiring the stamps denoting

payment of the tax to be affixed by the manufacturer or the
wholesaler to each bottle or container of distilled spirits before
shipment to any retailer (OCGA § 3-4-61 (2) (1982))f the General
Assembly expressed its intent that the excise tax be paid before
the product was made available for purchase by the consuming
public.4 Where a wholesaler is a link in the chain of delivery of
the product to the retailer, it is essential that the excise tax be
paid by the time the product leaves the wholesaler.5
here,

the

manufacturer

remits

tax

payment

to

Where, as

the

revenue

commissioner and subsequently, in an itemized billing statement,
requires the wholesaler to remit payment for "state stamps" or
••state tax,1' it is the wholesaler which is the taxpayer for
purposes of OCGA § 48-2-35.6

Due to its lack of standing,

appellant is procedurally barred from pursuing an action for refund
under OCGA § 48-2-35.
3. Even assuming that appellant was not procedurally barred
from seeking a refund under § 48-2-35, federal due process, as
4

Stamps denoting the payment of the excise tax were required
to be affixed to each bottle or container of distilled spirits.
OCGA 5 3-4-61 (1982). Effective February 1, 1993, the revenue
commissioner is required to adopt rules and regulations eliminating
the use of a stamp in the payment of the excise tax on distilled
spirits and alcohol. See OCGA § 3-4-61 (1992),
5

ln 1992, the legislature amended OCGA § 3-4-61 to state
explicitly that the excise tax was to be paid by the wholesale
dealer- OCGA § 3-4-61 (a) (1992)•
^Credits or refunds issued in the discretion of the revenue
commissioner tinder OCGA § 3-2-13 to a manufacturer are statutorily
required to be refunded or credited to the wholesaler, the party
who actually paid the tax.

4

interpreted by the Supreme Court in ftcKesson Corp. v, Fla.
iyicoholic Beverages and Tobacco Piv*, 496 U.S. 18 (110 SC 2323, 110
LE2d 148) (1990), and elaborated upon in Harper v» Virginia Dept.
of Taxation, 509 U.S.

(113 SC 2510, 509 LE2d

) (1993), does

not require that the State of Georgia refund to appellant the
discriminatory portion of the excise taxes appellant remitted in
1982-1984 pursuant to OCGA § 3-2-60*7

A governmental requirement that one pay a tax deprives the
payor of property, and such a deprivation mandates compliance with
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States.
Due process requires a government to have procedural means by which
the taxpayer may safeguard against unlawful exactions*
110 SC 2238, supra, at 2250,

McKesson,

"The fundamental requirement of due

process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in
a meaningful manner," [Cits]." Mathews v. Eldridere, 424 U.S- 319,
333 (96 SC 893f 47 LE2d 18) (1976).

While due process generally

requires that the hearing be held prior to the deprivation, the
Court, recognizing that the exaction of taxes is the lifeblood of
a governmental entity, has permitted governments to exact taxes and
require the taxpayer to voice objections to the tax thereafter.
Should the governmental entity so procedurally limit itself, it
7

Appellant contends that our statement in Beam I. 259 Ga. 363,
at 365f that the State would have to refund monies should the
Bacchus decision be applied retroactively is a conclusive admission
that refunds are due now that the U.S. Supreme Court has decided
the retroactivity issue adversely to the State• Beam, 501 U.S.
In so relying on the statement, appellant has taken it out of its
context, a discussion of the equities of retroactivity under the
analysis set forth in Chevron oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (92 SC 349,
30 LE2d 296) (1971).
5

must provide "meaningful, backward-looking relief to rectify any
unconstitutional deprivation.11 McKesson. supra, at 2247. However,
should the government provide a procedure through which the
taxpayer may challenge the validity of the taking prior to the
deprivation the Due Process Clause is satisfied.
n*21.

IdL, at 2251f

Thus, before attempting to fashion a post-deprivation,

meaningful, backward-looking remedy,8 we must determine the state
law question of whether Georgia law "provides an adequate form of
predeprivation process.••." Harper v. Va. Dept, of Taxation. 113
SC 2510, supra, at 2520.
4*

In its discussions on the topic, the U.S. supreme Court

illustrates "predeprivation process" as that which authorizes
taxpayers to bring suit to enjoin imposition of a tax prior to its
payment, or that which permits taxpayers to withhold contested tax
assessments and challenge their validity
hearing.

in a predeprivation

McKesson, supra, at 2250 and 2251r n.21.

In Georgia, a

taxpayer who fails to pay taxes due is subject to being named a
defendant in an action brought by the revenue commissioner to
collect the amount due*

OCGA S 48-2-54.

In such an action, the

taxpayer would have the opportunity to challenge the validity of
the imposition of the contested taxation prior to paying the tax.
That the Commissioner is statutorily authorized to seek penalties

*The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently left it to the States
to craft an appropriate post-deprivation remedy. See e.g..Harper
v, Va. Dept. of Taxation, supra? James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Ga,, supra; McKesson v. Fla» Alcoholic Beverages & c , supra; Davis
v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (109 SC 1500, 103 LE2d 891) (1989); and
Bacchus Imports v. Dias, supra.
6

is not a financial sanction tantamount to an attempt to secure
payment of taxes under duress (see jfcKesson. supra, at 2251, n.2i,
and Harper, supra, at 2519, n. 10) since the penalties are subject
to waiver by the revenue commissioner upon a determination that the
taxpayer's default was the result of reasonable cause and was not
due to gross or willful neglect or disregard of the law or
regulations. OCGA § 3-2-12.
5.

In addition, Georgia statutes make declaratory judgment

relief available prior to payment of disputed taxes "to settle and
afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to
rights, status, and other legal relations..," (OCGA § 9-4-1), and
such relief is available even if the party has other adequate legal
or equitable remedies.

OCGA § 9-4-2 (c) .

The Declaratory Judgment Act is an alternative or
additional remedy to facilitate the administration of
justice more readily . „. [and is] intended to give
additional protection to a person who may become involved
in an actual justiciable controversy,.. • rghippen v,
Folsom, 200 Ga, SB, 6B (35 SE2d 915) (1945)].

Another intended purpose of declaratory judgment is "to afford a
speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating legal disputes."
Clein v. Kaplan. 201 Ga*

396, 404

(40 SE2d 133)

(1946).

In

furtherance of this goal, the Declaratory Judgment Act empowers the
superior court in which a petition for declaratory judgment is
filed to grant injunctive or other interlocutory extraordinary
relief in connection with the petition• OCGA § 9-4-3 (b); see also
OCGA § 9-11-65 (b) •

Thus, a petition may be filed seeking a

judgment declaring a statute or ordinance unconstitutional and
praying for an injunction against the enforcement of the questioned
7

lav.

See e,g*, Gravely v. Bacon. 263 Ga. 203 (429 SE2d 663)

(1993); State of Georgia v. Private Truck Council & c , 258 Ga. 531
(371 SE2d 378) (1988); City of Atlanta v. Spence. 242 Ga, 194 (249
SE2d 554) (1978); State of Georgia v. Golia. 235 Ga, 791 (222 SE2d
27) (1976)•*

Should the party seeking relief be threatened with

immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage, the party may
apply immediately for a temporary restraining order• OCGA § 9-1165 (b) * When tax statutes have been the subject of a declaratory
judgment action, the trial court has exercised its discretion to
establish escrow funds for payment of the disputed taxes should the
taxpayer choose to tender payment582

(385 SE2d 74)

See Collins v. Waldron, 259 Ga.

(1989) ; State of Georgia v. Private Truck

Council. supra, at Div* 4.

In sum, a taxpayer who wishes to

challenge the validity of a statute that imposes a duty upon him to
pay a tax may do so prior to paying the disputed tax, and has
recourse to judicial remedies to enjoin collection of the contested
tax pending final determination of his judicial challenge to the
statute.
6. Finally, within the Georgia Alcoholic Beverage Code (OCGA
§1 3-1-1 et seq.) there is in place the means by which appellant,
as a licensed wholesale dealer (see OCGA § 3-1-2 (23)), could
receive administrative review, complete with notice and a hearing,

9

ln point of fact, in 1985, several of appellant's attorneys,
then representing an importer of alcoholic beverages, filed an
action against Georgia's taxing authorities in which they sought a
declaratory judgment that a taxing statute was unconstitutional and
an injunction against its enforcement. See Hublein, inc. v. State
of Georgia. 256 Ga. 578 (351 SE2d 190) (1987).
8

of the commissi oner's determination that appellant had not remitted
the "proper amount of taxes.m

OCGA § 3-2-11

(2).

Under this

scheme, appellant could remit the non-discriminatory portion of its
tax assessment and attack the taxing statute in the administrative
hearing held to determine the amount due.

The notice and hearing

provisions of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (OCGA § 5013) are incorporated into the procedure for assessment of taxes due
in OCGA § 3-2-11

(2),

Furthermore, within the APA there is a

section exclusively devoted to the hearing procedure required of
the Department of Revenue within 30 days of receipt of a demand
therefor by "any taxpayer aggrieved by any act of the department in
a matter involving his liability for taxes..•„"

OCGA § 50-13-12.

OCGA §50-13-12 (d) recognizes that judicial remedies may also be
available to the aggrieved taxpayer, and requires the taxpayer to
elect between pursuing judicial remedies or the remedy available
for a "contested case" within the APA.
7.

The above survey of certain provisions of Georgia law in

place and available to appellant prior to its payment of taxes in
1982 - 1985 establishes that appellant had available to it several
means by which it could attack the validity of former OCGA § 3-4-60
prior to remitting taxes due thereunder.

Instead, appellant chose

to pay the taxes charged without questioning the legal basis
therefor.

Having failed to avail itself of any one of the variety

of predeprivation remedies available to itf appellant cannot now
complain.

See United gtates v. Tax Commission of Mississippi. 412

U.S* 363, 368, n. 11 (93 SC 2183, 37 LE2d 1} (1973); McKesson v.
9

Fla« Div. of Alcoholic &c.. supra, at 2251, n. 21.
We conclude that appellant was procedurally barred from
pursuing a refund action for the taxes remitted in 1982 - 1985
pursuant to former OCGA § 3-4-60 and that, even if appellant were
entitled to pursue a refund action, its failure to avail itself of
the predeprivation remedies available to it prior to payment of the
disputed taxes results in denial of recovery of taxes so paid.
8, in light of our decision on the issues raised in A93A1217,
we need not address the enumeration of errors asserted in A93A1218,
Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Sears-

Collins and Carley, JJ., who concur in Divisions 1 and 2 and the
judgment.

10

S93A1217, S93A1218, JAMES B. BEAK DISTILLING CO. v. THE STATE OF
GEORGIA et al. (two cases)
CARLEY, Justice, concurring.
Divisions l and 2 of the majority opinion hold that appellant
has no standing to seek a refund of taxes that it previously paid
the State pursuant to former OCGA § 3-4-60.

I concur fully in

those divisions and in the judgment of affirmance based upon the
procedural bar of appellant's lack of standing.

Since appellant

has no standing to seek a refund, I would not reach the merits of
appellant's entitlement to recover a refund which the majority
addresses in Divisions 3# 4f 5, 6 and 7 of its opinion*

I would

note, however, thatr for the reasons set forth in my dissent in
Reich v, Collins.

Ga.

(Case Number S93A0621, decided December

, 1993), I believe that the majority erroneously holds in those
divisions that appellant would be barred from recovering a refund
for its failure to have pursued the predeprivation remedies that
are available to a Georgia taxpayer.
I am authorized to state that Justice Sears-collins joins in
this opinion.

